We study the relationship between competition and quality within a spatial competition framework where …rms compete in prices and quality. We generalise existing literature on spatial price-quality competition along several dimensions, including utility functions that are non-linear in income and cost functions that are non-separable in output and quality. Our main message is that the scope for a positive relationship between competition and quality is underestimated in the existing literature. If we allow for income e¤ects by assuming that utility is strictly concave in income, we …nd that lower transportation costs always lead to higher quality. The presence of income e¤ects might also reverse a previously reported negative relationship between the number of …rms and equilibrium quality. This reversal result is further strenghtened if there are cost substitutabilities between output and quality. Equilibrium quality provision is always less than socially optimal in the presence of income e¤ects.
Introduction
Does more competition induce …rms to produce higher-quality goods? If prices are exogenous (e.g., due to price regulation), more competition will increase quality if prices are above marginal costs. This is a well established result in the literature on spatial competition. 1 However, if prices are endogenously set by …rms, then the e¤ect of competition on quality incentives is uncertain. While more competition increases the incentives to supply high quality for given prices, more competition also reduces the price-cost margin, which, in turn, reduces the incentives to invest in quality. Thus, the net e¤ect of competition on quality is generally ambiguous under price competition.
Intensity of competition is often measured either as an increase in the number of …rms in the market or as a reduction in the degree of horizontal product di¤erentiation (or transportation costs). Using the latter measure, Ma and Burgess (1993) report no e¤ect of less product di¤erentiation on quality incentives. In their paper, the direct e¤ect of more competition on quality incentives is exactly o¤set by the indirect e¤ect via lower prices. The same result is reported by Gravelle (1999) . Using the number of …rms as a competition measure, Economides (1993) …nds that more …rms in the market reduces the incentives to invest in quality. Since a higher number of …rms reduces the potential demand for each single …rm, the returns to quality investments are correspondingly reduced.
In the present paper, we revisit the existing literature on price and quality competition in a spatial framework. We use a Salop-type model where …rms have di¤erent locations, referring to product space or geographical space. In this set-up, we allow for price-quality competition. For the main part of the analysis, we assume that …rms choose price and quality simultaneously. In an extension to the main model, we also allow for sequential choices, where quality is treated more as a long term variable. We take a closer look at the e¤ects of spatial competition on quality and prices by generalising previous work along several dimensions. First, we allow for income e¤ects by assuming that the utility function is concave in the numeraire good. Second, we decompose the transportation costs into monetary and non-monetary costs. While non-monetary transportation costs a¤ect utility directly, monetary transportation costs add to the consumption expenditures and a¤ect utility through the budget constraint. This distinction should be particularly relevant with respect to di¤erent interpretations of …rm location (product space versus geographical space). Third, we apply general bene…t and production cost functions where we allow for quality and output to be either cost complements or cost substitutes.
One of our main results is that the relationship between competition and quality depends crucially on the presence of income e¤ects; i.e., whether utility is linear or strictly concave in income. If utility is linear in income, more competition -as measured by lower transportation costs -leads to lower prices but has no e¤ect on quality, since the two aforementioned e¤ects exactly cancel each other out (as in Ma and Burgess, 1993, and Gravelle, 1999) . Clearly, this is a special case. If we allow for utility to be strictly concave in income, the dampening e¤ect of competition on quality incentives via a lower price-cost margin is smaller, implying that the net e¤ect is positive: lower transportation costs always lead to higher quality in equilibrium. This conclusion holds regardless of whether we are considering monetary or non-monetary transportation costs. In a simpli…ed version of the model, we also show that this conclusion is robust to the case where quality and price choices are made sequentially.
The only qualitative di¤erence between monetary and non-monetary transportation costs is that lower monetary transportation costs (as opposed to non-monetary ones) might lead to higher, rather than lower, prices in equilibrium if the degree of cost substitutability between quality and output is su¢ ciently strong. The degree of cost substitutability is also important in determining the quality e¤ects of a higher number of …rms in the market.
With constant marginal utility of income and cost independence between quality and output, we replicate the result by Economides (1993) that more …rms lead to lower quality.
However, we show that this result is reversed for a su¢ cient degree of cost substitutability (more …rms increase quality). Furthermore, with decreasing marginal utility of income we can establish a positive relationship between …rm density and equilibrium quality even for (mild) cost complementarities.
We also derive and characterise the socially optimal quality level, …nding that the Nash equilibrium quality level is never socially excessive. If utility is linear in income, equilibrium quality coincides with the socially optimal level. This result is well known from the literature (Ma and Burgess, 1993; Gravelle, 1999) and is due to the marginal utility being equal for the marginal and average consumer. 2;3 However, if utility is strictly concave in income, the marginal utility is higher for the marginal than for the average consumer in the Nash equilibrium, implying that the equilibrium supply of quality is below the socially optimal level.
As indicated above, the papers closest to ours are Ma and Burgess (1993), Economides (1993) and Gravelle (1999) , who all studied, in various ways, the e¤ect of spatial competition on prices and quality. While the e¤ect of competition on prices is less ambiguous, and thus perhaps less interesting, the relationship between competition and quality is far from clear-cut. In fact, the existing literature suggests that we cannot expect …rms to provide higher quality as a result of more competition. Our main message is that this conclusion is too pessimistic. In a more general framework we show that the special assumptions of linear utility functions and cost separability between quality and output are not innocuous and have led to an underestimation of the scope for competition to improve quality.
In addition to the three key papers cited above, there are also other papers that analyse the relationship between competition and quality using di¤erent types of modelling framework. Incorporating product quality into an oligopoly model with a Marshalliantype demand system, Banker et al. (1998) use several di¤erent measures of the degree of competition and conclude that the e¤ect of increased competition on quality is generally ambiguous in all cases considered. In a very di¤erent setting, where …rms and consumers interact repeatedly and quality is only ex-post observable, Kranton (2003) extends the 2 This criterion was …rst established by Spence (1975) . 3 In a model where quality a¤ects the degree of perceived horizontal di¤erentiation, Degryse and Irmen (2001) show that …rms'private incentives for quality provision generally depart from the socially optimal ones. When quality and price decisions are made simultaneously, they …nd that quality provision is socially excessive if the correlation between quality and horizontal di¤erentiation is negative. The relationship between competition and quality is not an issue in the paper. previous literature on reputation-based quality incentives (e.g., Klein and Le-er, 1981; Shapiro, 1983; Allen, 1984) to show that competition between …rms might eliminate perfect equilibria in which …rms produce high-quality goods.
There is also an empirical literature on the relationship between competition and quality, with studies from several di¤erent industries. Mazzeo (2003) uses the frequency of on-time ‡ight departures as a measure of quality in the US airline industry and …nds a positive correlation between competition and quality. Using questionnaire data from the UK, Domberger and Sherr (1989) show that the introduction of competition for conveyancing services led not only to price reductions, but also to an increase in the quality of the legal services o¤ered. While both of these studies point to a clear-cut positive relationship between competition and quality, a more mixed picture emanates from studies of competition and quality in the banking industry. Dick (2007) a negative correlation using UK data. 4 Clearly, the spatial competition framework we use in our analysis is relevant for many markets, including the speci…c ones mentioned above. In retail markets, for example, outlets are spatially di¤erentiated due to di¤erent physical locations, and retailers may use price and service (quality) in order to get consumers to buy from them. The assumption that utility is non-linear in income implies that our analysis is particularly relevant for markets where the purchasing decision can be described as a discrete choice with income e¤ects. One example is automobile markets, where the consumer typically buys one car from the most preferred dealer and the purchase expenditures usually constitute a sig-ni…cant fraction of the consumer's income. While income e¤ects are obviously relevant in the demand for cars, we would expect income e¤ects to be present also in markets for numerous other commodities that are relatively expensive, like TVs, Hi-Fi, furnitures, etc.
This will certainly also be the case in private markets for health care and education. In such markets, the quality dimension is also highly important.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section we outline the model and derive the equilibrium price and quality under the assumption of simultaneous choices. In Section 3 we analyse the e¤ects of competition on prices and quality, measuring an increase in competition intensity either as a reduction of (monetary or non-monetary) transportation costs or as an increase in the number of …rms in the market. In Section 4 we derive the socially optimal level of quality and characterise the welfare properties of the Nash equilibrium. In Section 5 we consider the case of sequential quality and price decisions in a simpli…ed version of the model. The paper is concluded in Section 6.
Model
There are n …rms equidistantly located on a circle with circumference equal to 1, each o¤ering a product at price p i , i = 1; :::; n. Consumers are located on the circle according to a density function f ( ). We assume that f is identical and symmetric between any two …rms, and the total consumer mass is normalised to 1. Each consumer buys one unit of the product from the most preferred …rm. If a consumer buys from Firm i, her utility is given by a function U i (q i ; d i ; y), where q i is the quality of the product sold by Firm i, d i is the distance between the consumer and Firm i, and y is a composite numeraire good.
Assuming a separable additive form, we write the utility function as
where Y is gross income. The utility derived from product quality is given by the function We also assume that utility is concave in consumption of the numeraire good: u y > 0, u yy 0.
The distance between any two …rms is equal to 1=n, and we assume that v is su¢ ciently large to ensure full market coverage in equilibrium. If we let Firm i be located at zero and measure distance clockwise, the consumer who is indi¤erent between buying from Firm i
and Firm i + 1 is located at z + , implicitly given by:
An equivalent condition determines the location of the consumer who is indi¤erent between Firm i and Firm i 1, denoted by z . Total demand for Firm i is then given by
Once we derive the demand function, we can specify Firm i's pro…ts as
where
Notice that we allow for both cost complementarity (C Xq < 0) and cost substitutability (C Xq > 0) between output and quality.
Assume that all n …rms choose price and quality simultaneously. The …rst-order conditions for Firm i's pro…t-maximising choice of price and quality are then given by 5
By solving (6) for (p i C X ) and substituting into (7), we can express (7) as
Since the model is symmetric, all …rms will choose the same price and quality in equilibrium. If p i 1 = p i+1 and q i 1 = q i+1 , total demand for Firm i is given by
Given p i 1 = p i+1 and q i 1 = q i+1 , we can totally di¤erentiate (6)- (7) to …nd @z=@p i and @z=@q i , and use (9) to calculate the partial derivatives of total demand with respect to price and quality, respectively:
Using (10) and (11), the unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is given by (6) and (8) . Setting p i = p and q i = q, i = 1; ::; n, and noting that F (z + ) = z + = 1 2n in the symmetric equilibrium, the equilibrium price and quality are given by the following system of equations: 6
3 Price and quality e¤ects of competition
In spatial competition models, a standard competition measure is the (inverse of) transportation cost. Lower transportation costs increase the degree of substitutability between the products o¤ered by di¤erent …rms, which intensi…es competition. In a Salop model,
we can also use the number of …rms as a measure of the intensity of competition. In the following, we will use both of these measures to analyse the e¤ects of increased competition on equilibrium prices and quality.
Transportation costs
In our model, we have two di¤erent measures of transportation costs, where the parameter t measures the non-monetary costs while the parameter measures the monetary ones.
Using Cramer's rule, the e¤ects of t on the equilibrium price and quality are given by 7
and
Proposition 1 Lower non-monetary transportation costs a¤ ect equilibrium prices and quality as follows:
(i) If utility is linear in income, prices fall while quality is una¤ ected;
(ii) If utility is strictly concave in income, prices fall while quality increases.
The result that more competition reduces prices is standard and deserves no further explanation. The e¤ect on quality is less obvious. Increased substitutability implies that demand becomes more responsive to both price and quality, as we can see from (10) and (11) . This gives each …rm an incentive to reduce the price and increase quality. However, 7 The details of all the comparative statics calculations in this section are given in the Appendix.
a price reduction implies a lower price-cost margin, which reduces the incentive to provide quality, as we can see from (7) . Due to these two counteracting e¤ects, the total equilibrium e¤ect of increased substitutability on quality is a priori ambiguous. Our results show that the total e¤ect depends crucially on the marginal utility of income. If the marginal utility is constant, the two e¤ects cancel each other out and the equilibrium quality level is independent of t, as in Ma and Burgess (1993) and Gravelle (1999) . However, if utility is strictly concave, the indirect e¤ect on quality incentives through a lower price-cost margin is reduced, implying that lower non-monetary transportation costs will increase the equilibrium supply of quality. Thus, with a decreasing marginal utility of income, consumers bene…t from more competition (measured as a reduction of non-monetary transportation costs) along all dimensions as prices fall while quality increases.
Our other (inverse) measure of the degree of substitutability is the monetary transportation costs, re ‡ected by the parameter . Again, using Cramer's rule, the e¤ects of a marginal change in on equilibrium price and quality are given by
Proposition 2 Lower monetary transportation costs a¤ ect equilibrium prices and quality as follows:
(ii) If utility is strictly concave in income, quality increases and prices may also increase if C Xq > 0 and/or t is su¢ ciently high.
As for the case of non-monetary transportation costs, the price and quality e¤ects of lower monetary transportation costs depend crucially on whether the marginal utility of income is constant or decreasing. As before, the e¤ect on quality is zero in the former case and positive in the latter. 8 The qualitative di¤erence between monetary and nonmonetary costs is the potential e¤ect on equilibrium prices, where a reduction in might actually lead to higher prices in equilibrium. If u yy < 0, prices may increase if there is su¢ ciently strong cost substitutability between quality and output. The reason is that, if C Xq > 0, a higher quality level increases the marginal cost of production, which puts an upward pressure on prices. Notice, however, that a price increase is only a possibility under decreasing marginal utility of income. If u yy = 0, quality is una¤ected by monetary transportation costs and the above mentioned e¤ect on prices via the cost function is thus absent.
Firm density
In order to simplify the analysis somewhat, we assume here that the distribution of consumers is uniform around the circle, implying that f ( ) = 1. Let us …rst consider the relationship between n and p, which is given by
The sign of this expression is generally ambiguous. In the standard versions of the model, where u yy = 0 and C Xq = 0, we see that the sign is negative and we get the expected result that a higher number of …rms leads to lower prices. However, if the marginal utility of income is decreasing, this result might potentially be reversed. We can see this more
clearly by considering the special case of constant marginal production and transportation costs, and cost independence between output and quality:
In this case, the relationship between n and p is given by dp dn
which is positive if u yy is su¢ ciently large in absolute value. The e¤ect that works in the "counterintuitive" direction is the following: for given (and symmetric) prices and qualities, a higher …rm density implies that the net income of the marginal (indi¤erent)
consumer increases due to lower monetary transportation costs. If utility is strictly concave in income, this means that the marginal utility of income decreases, which, in turn, reduces the demand responsiveness to prices (cf. (10)). All else equal, this e¤ect provides an incentive to increase prices.
The e¤ect of a higher number of …rms on the equilibrium quality is given by
where := 2g d t + 3h d u y + 2u y C XX > 0. The sign of (20) is generally ambiguous. In the case of constant marginal utility of income (u yy = 0), we see that equilibrium quality is increasing in the number of …rms if the degree of cost substitutability between output and quality is su¢ ciently high: C Xq > b q =u y . In the special case of C Xq = 0, equilibrium quality is inversely related to the number of …rms, since more …rms reduce the potential demand for each …rm, thereby reducing the gain of providing high-quality products. This corresponds exactly to the case analysed by Economides (1993) , where u yy = C Xq = 0.
However, if there is cost substitutability between output and quality, a higher number of …rms in the market reduces the marginal cost of quality improvements due to the lower level of demand facing each …rm. If this second e¤ect is su¢ ciently strong, the negative relationship between n and q may be reversed. 9 The sign of @q =@n is harder to 9 Both e¤ects are present in Gravelle (1999) , where uy = bq = 1 and C (X; q) = q 2 X. With this particular formulation, it turns out that the two e¤ects exactly cancel each other out and quality is independent of the number of …rms in the market. characterise if the marginal utility of income is decreasing (u yy < 0) and the only general conclusion that can be drawn is that the relationship between q and n is ambiguous.
We summarise the above discussion as follows:
Proposition 3 (i) If utility is linear in income and the marginal cost of providing quality is independent of output, a higher number of …rms leads to lower prices in equilibrium.
This relationship might be reversed if utility is strictly concave in income.
(ii) If utility is linear in income, a higher number of …rms leads to higher quality in equilibrium if the degree of cost substitutability between output and quality is su¢ ciently high. If utility is concave in income, the relationship between the number of …rms and equilibrium quality is generally ambiguous.
A parametric example
For illustrative purposes, consider the following parametric example where utility is logarithmic in income and linear in quality and distance: u (y) = ln y, b (q i ) = bq i and h (d) =
We also assume a linear-quadratic cost function:
where c > 0, k > 0 and 7 0.
By using these speci…c functional forms in (12)- (13), we derive the following explicit expressions for equilibrium price and quality:
The comparative statics results with respect to the di¤erent measures of competition intensity are given by
where y = Y p 2n is the net income of the marginal (indi¤erent) consumers in equilibrium.
The results from this example con…rm the analysis of the general model. Here, we see that a higher value of increases the parameter space for which equilibrium quality is increasing in the number of …rms. However, for certain parameter con…gurations, a positive relationship between q and n can also be established even for (mild) cost complementarity between output and quality (i.e., < 0). Numerical simulations also suggest that a price increase due to a higher number of …rms appears only for a very restricted parameter con…guration.
Social welfare
Does the market provide the socially optimal level of quality? Suppose that the government can provide output and quality directly, and …nance the cost of provision through a lumpsum tax T . Applying symmetry, the …rst-best level of quality -equal for all …rms -is such that it maximises the utilitarian welfare function
subject to the resource constraint
By inserting (28) into (27), yielding
and maximising with respect to q, the socially optimal level of quality is implicitly given
Notice that the denominator on the LHS of (30) is the marginal utility of income for the average consumer (with the average taken across distance). Thus, the socially optimal level of quality is characterised by the ratio of the marginal utility of quality and the marginal utility of income for the average consumer being equal to the marginal cost of quality provision.
The Nash equilibrium level of quality, on the other hand, is implicitly given by
where the denominator on the LHS is the marginal utility of income for the marginal consumer, who is indi¤erent between two …rms. Consequently, the di¤erence between the Nash equilibrium level of quality (q ) and the socially optimal level (q s ) depends on how the marginal utility of income compares for the average and marginal consumers, respectively.
Proposition 4 (i) If utility is linear in income, the Nash equilibrium level of quality coincides with the socially optimal level.
(ii) If utility is strictly concave in income, the Nash equilibrium level of quality is lower than the socially optimal level.
The …rst part of the proposition con…rms the result reported in Ma and Burgess (1993), and shows that this result generalises beyond speci…c forms of the transportation and production cost functions. However, this result hinges crucially on the assumption of constant marginal utility of income. Comparing (30) and (31), notice that p nC 1 n ; q , since, when the population is normalised to one, nC 1 n ; q can be interpreted as the average cost of production. Moreover, notice also that h 1 2n
h(x) for any x. Thus, when comparing (30) and (31), we see that the income of the marginal consumer in the Nash equilibrium is lower than the average income in the …rst-best solution. With diminishing marginal utility of income, this means that, for q = q , the marginal utility of income for the average consumer is higher than the marginal cost of quality provision, implying an underprovision of quality in the Nash equilibrium.
It follows from Proposition 4 that increased competition a¤ects the welfare properties of the Nash equilibrium only in the case of diminishing marginal utility of income (or, more generally, if utility is non-linear in income). The e¤ects of reduced non-monetary transportation costs are fairly straightforward. Since the …rst-best level of quality does not depend on non-monetary transportation costs, a reduction in t will unambiguously improve welfare since equilibrium quality increases towards the …rst-best level. 10 Monetary transportation costs, on the other hand, a¤ect both q and q s . However, notice that a reduction in reduces the di¤erence between transportation costs for the average and marginal consumers, respectively. If, in addition, a reduction in also leads to a price reduction, the di¤erence between quality levels in the Nash equilibrium and the …rst-best solution are unambiguously reduced.
The welfare e¤ect of an increase in the number of …rms is considerably more involved and depends, inter alia, on the characteristics of the cost function. Using the parametric example from Section 3.3 it can be shown (by numerical simulations) that the e¤ect is generally ambiguous. This naturally re ‡ects that fact that @q =@n 7 0.
Sequential quality and price choices
In this section we extend the main analysis by considering the case where the quality and price choices are made sequentially. More speci…cally, we consider a game with the following order of moves: By introducing sequential decision making, the analysis is severely complicated. Thus, in order to facilitate analytical tractability, we make a number of simplifying assumptions:
f (x) = 1, C Xq = 0 and n = 2. This means that we restrict attention to our most important generalisation: allowing utility to be concave in income.
When n = 2, total demand for Firm i is given by 2z + , where z + is implicitly given by (3) . When = 0, we can solve (3) explicitly and derive demand for Firm i as
The price subgame
For a given pair of quality levels, (q i ; q j ), the equilibrium in the price subgame is characterised by the …rst-order condition
from which we can derive the relationships between qualities and prices. Applying Cramer's rule, these comparative statics results are given by
where p > 0 is de…ned as
Quality choices
Using the equilibrium values of the price subgame, we can express Firm i's pro…ts as a function of qualities only. The …rst-order condition for Firm i's pro…t-maximising choice of quality level is
Applying symmetry and using (32) and (34)- (35), equilibrium quality is characterised by
Equilibrium analysis
From (33) we see that, in the symmetric equilibrium, prices do not depend on quality levels. This is due to the assumption of cost independence between quality and output (C Xq = 0), and also implies that equilibrium prices are identical in the simultaneous and sequential versions of the game. Comparing (12) and (33), we see that the equilibrium price in both versions of the game is characterised by p = C X + t 2uy . We can use this expression to characterise the equilibrium quality as follows:
Comparing (13) and (40), we see that equilibrium quality is lower if price and quality choices are made sequentially. The di¤erence is represented by the second term in the square brackets of (40). This con…rms that the "underinvestment" result reported by Ma and Burgess (1993) is robust to the assumption of decreasing marginal utility of income.
We already know from Proposition 4 that, if utility is concave in income, quality is below the socially optimal level in the simultaneous price-quality game. Thus, equilibrium quality is even more suboptimal if quality and price decisions are made sequentially.
In order to examine the e¤ect of competition on prices and quality when these are determined sequentially, we apply the following functional forms: u (y) = ln y and
. This allows us to derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium price and quality:
In this simpli…ed version of the model, the degree of competition is (inversely) measured by the parameter t. The e¤ects of changes in the degree of competition on equilibrium prices and quality are given by
Thus, the competition e¤ects on prices and quality are in this example qualitatively unaffected by whether the decisions are taken simultaneously or sequentially. As long as utility is strictly concave in income, a more competitive market (measured as a reduction in t)
produces lower prices and higher quality in equilibrium.
We can also use this parameterisation to say something about how the di¤erence between quality levels under simultaneous and sequential decision making depends on the degree of competition in the market. Denoting equilibrium quality with simultaneous and sequential decisions by, respectively, q and q , the degree of "underinvestment" due to sequential decision making is given by
from which we derive
Thus, the degree of underinvestment is larger in more competitive markets (lower t). This is quite intuitive, since the underinvestment results stems from what Ma and Burgess dub "the price undercutting e¤ect"; i.e., incentives for quality investments at the …rst stage are dampened by the fact that the rival …rm will "compensate" by undercutting its price at the next stage. The incentive for such price undercutting is stronger in more competitive markets, where demand reacts more strongly to price changes.
Concluding remarks
The relationship between competition and quality is theoretically ambiguous when …rms also compete in prices. Within a framework of spatial competition, we have shown in this paper that the e¤ect of competition on quality depends crucially on the presence of income e¤ects on the demand side and cost dependence between output and quality on the supply side. More speci…cally, if we use transportation costs (i.e., the degree of horizontal di¤erentiation) as an inverse measure of competition intensity, more competition will always increase quality in equilibrium if the marginal utility of income is decreasing. If we measure competition intensity by the number of …rms in the market, we …nd a positive relationship between competition and quality also for the case of constant marginal utility of income, provided that there is a su¢ cient degree of cost substitutability between output and quality. Thus, when seen in conjunction with existing theoretical literature, our results suggest that the scope for spatial competition to stimulate quality provision is larger than previously thought.
The presence of income e¤ects on the demand side also implies that, from a social welfare perspective, the market provides a sub-optimal level of quality even in the case where prices and quality are chosen simultaneously, a result which is also new to the litera-ture. More speci…cally, if utility is strictly concave in income, equilibrium quality is always below the socially optimal level. Thus, although clear-cut and unambiguous conclusions are hard to reach, due to the general nature of our model, our results seem to suggest that the scope for welfare-enhancing competition is larger than previously indicated in the literature on spatial price-quality competition.
Appendix
Using the notation V xy := @Vx @y , we derive, from (12)- (13), the following expressions: 
The comparative statics results reported in equations (14), (15), (16), (17), (18) and (20) are then found by using Cramer's rule:
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